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Abstract 
This paper assesses the comparative impact of the 2007 global financial crisis 
on the short and long-term performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) in 
the Asian-Pacific emerging markets of Thailand, China, South Korea, and 
Malaysia. Our results indicate that the short-term performance or underpric-
ing of Thai IPOs increased from 19% to 44% between the pre-crisis and 
post-crisis periods. IPOs in each of the three other emerging markets expe-
rienced a reduction in underpricing after the financial crisis. While our re-
sults are consistent with previous IPO research, the degree of underpricing in 
each emerging market exceeded the levels found in studies of IPOs in devel-
oped countries. In terms of the long-term performance of IPOs, our results 
suggest that IPOs in Thailand, China, and South Korea performed better in 
the post-crisis period, while Malaysian IPOs performed worse. Our overall 
findings suggest that the 2007 financial crisis affected IPO performance and 
economic growth in each of the markets studied. 
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1. Introduction 
An initial public offering (IPO) is a process by which a private company makes 
its first sale of shares to the general public with the assistance of an investment 
bank. An issuer sells its shares to an investment bank (the “underwriter”) who 
then re-sells the issuer’s shares to the public, via a stock exchange. IPO offerings 
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are often underpriced since a share’s offer price (the price offered to the compa-
ny by the underwriter) is likely to be lower than its closing price on the first day 
of trading. If the difference between these two price points is multiplied by the 
number of shares sold the resulting amount equals the money “left on the table” 
by the issuing company. During the 1990s, U.S IPO issuers paid $13 billion in 
fees to underwriters but left more than $27 billion on the table [1]. As a result, 
many studies have focused on investigating the short-term (underpricing) and 
long-term performance of IPOs [2] [3] [4]. Other work has focused on fluctua-
tions within the total volume of IPOs in relation to aggregate capital demands of 
private companies [5] and the valuation of IPOs using comparable firm mul-
tiples [6].  
Despite this previous work, Yong [7] identifies that relatively little is known 
about IPO activity in certain Asian markets. Recent research suggests that the 
Asia-Pacific region leads world markets in terms of the growth and support of 
IPOs. During 2012, the Asia-Pacific region accounted for 57% and 44% of total 
worldwide IPOs and total global capital raised from IPOs. More specifically, the 
largest IPO in 2012, apart from that of Facebook, was undertaken by the Malay-
sian firm, Felda. Within the Asian-Pacific region, the majority of IPO activity is 
conducted in China, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand. Of 
these, Thailand, China, South Korea, and Malaysia are classified as emerging 
markets. Despite the relative importance of IPOs in these emerging markets, few 
studies have investigating IPO activity in the region. As a result, the present 
study focuses on IPO activity in four specific Asian-Pacific emerging markets: 
Thailand, China, South Korea, and Malaysia. The paper does this by providing a 
comparative assessment as to how the 2007 global financial crisis affected IPO 
activity in each country by investigating the relative short and long-term per-
formance of IPOs in each market during the five years immediately before, and 
after the 2007 global financial crisis. 
Event study methodology is used to evaluate the short-term and long-term 
performance of IPOs in each country using 1 day and 36 month event windows, 
respectively. Short-term performance is measured using the market-adjusted 
abnormal return, and long-term performance is calculated using the cumulative 
average market-adjusted return. The total numbers of observations in each 
country ranged from 220 to 1,300 observations and include ten years of IPO data 
that cover the period from 1st January 2003 to 31st December 2012. 
The results of this study suggest that the short-term performance or under-
pricing of Thai IPOs increased from 19% to 44% between the pre-crisis and 
post-crisis periods. In contrast, each of the three other emerging markets studied 
experienced a reduction in IPO underpricing after the financial crisis. In China, 
underpricing decreased from 114% to 41.5%, in South Korea it declined from 
43.7% to 27.9%, and in Malaysia it fell from 30.1% to 11.3%. 
In terms of the long-term performance of IPOs, the results of this study sug-
gest that in Thailand, China, and South Korea, IPOs performed better in the 
post-crisis period, while Malaysian IPOs performed worse. The 36 months CARs 
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for IPOs in each country during the pre-crisis and post crisis periods were: 
Thailand 7.5% and 43.1%, China 5% and 25%, South Korea 18.9% and 50.5%, 
and Malaysia −25.8% and −30.9%.  
The rest of this study is structured as follows: section two critically evaluates 
the theoretical framework of short-term performance (underpicing) and 
long-term performance of IPOs. In addition it presents the empirical evidence of 
short-term and long-term performance of IPOs in each of the four emerging 
Asian-pacific countries. Section three discusses the sample data selection proce-
dure and the methodology used to investigate this study’s research objectives. 
Section four presents the research findings and a final section concludes this pa-
per. 
2. Literature Review 
This section critically evaluates the existing theoretical and empirical literature 
on IPOs with a specific focus on the issues of short-term (underpricing) and 
long-term performance of IPOs. 
2.1. Theoretical Framework 
The “abnormal” positive return achieved during the first trading day of an IPO 
has been an intriguing phenomenon for decades. Ljungqvist [8] defines under-
pricing as “the percentage difference between the price at which the IPO shares 
were sold to investors (the offer price) and the price at which the shares subse-
quently trade in the market”. Since the 1970s, there has been a great deal of re-
search dedicated to explaining and providing possible reasons as to why new is-
suances of equity are usually under-priced [9] [10]. 
There are many theoretical paths in the relevant literature trying to interpret 
IPOs underpricing. Information asymmetry between the market participants in 
IPOS is a key element for the majority of the different theoretical explanations 
offered. 
More recently, Rock [11] provides a model that explains the underpricing 
phenomena of IPOs by suggesting that there is asymmetric information among 
investors, with certain parties holding superior information that could signal to 
other uninformed investors about whether an IPO is a good or bad investment. 
As a result, the underwriter must price the shares at a discount to attract the un-
informed investors [11]. 
2.1.1. Asymmetric Information Theory 
When a firm goes public, there are normally three main participants in this 
process: the issuing firm, the underwriter (investment bank), and the investors. 
In an asymmetric information model, it is believed that information is not 
equally shared among the three participating groups. In other words, certain 
parties have more information than the others. Under this theoretical model, 
investors are classified into two groups: informed and uninformed investors. 
Rock [11] suggests that informed investors (parties holding superior informa-
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tion) could signal to other uninformed investors about whether an IPO is a good 
or bad investment. As a result, the underwriter must price the shares at a dis-
count to attract the uninformed investors. 
In a model devised by Baron [12], when a firm issues an IPO it hires an in-
vestment bank to perform three functions: underwriting, advising, and distribu-
tion of the IPOs. An important assumption of this model is that the investment 
bank has superior knowledge of the capital market than the firm itself. A firm 
that has uncertainty and less information about the market demand for its IPO 
would be more willing to accept a lower offer price for its stock. As a result, the 
greater the level of underpricing, the investment bank has more incentive to 
perform better in selling the IPO.  
2.1.2. Underwriter Reputation Theory 
This theory suggests that underpricing can be partly explained by reputation of 
the underwriting institution. As underpricing is affecting “ex-ante” uncertainty, 
issuing firms aim to hire reputable underwriters. Beatty and Ritter [3] suggest 
that there is a positive relationship between the ex-ante uncertainty about an 
IPO’s value and the eventual underpricing of that IPO. They also argue that an 
investment banker is the main enforcer of underpricing. While an investment 
banker may not be able to perfectly forecast the value of the issuing firms, bank-
ers who price the shares “off the line” (too high or too low) will be punished by 
the market, so that those investment bankers lose market share in subsequent 
periods. 
Nevertheless, the underwriter reputation theory is challenged by the inconsis-
tency of its predictions. For example, Cooney, et al. [13] discovered a reverse re-
lationship between underwriter reputation and the degree of underpricing in 
work conducted on a sample of IPOs during the period 1981-1998. Their results 
indicated a negative relationship between the reputation of underwriters and 
underpricing during the 1980s, but the relationship was found to be positive in 
IPOs completed during the 1990s. Despite these results, Cooney, et al. [13] sug-
gest that underwriter reputation theory is still valid if one applies certain classi-
fications to screen samples. 
2.1.3. Owner Dispersion Theory 
This theory suggests that owners of issuing firms ensure that IPOs are oversub-
scribed [14]. If investor demand is more than the supply of shares available, the 
shares will be rationed to investors. By using underpricing to create a surplus in 
demand, the issuer can control the allocation of post-IPO ownership strategical-
ly through the share allocation process in order to retain control after the IPO 
takes place. 
Booth, et al. [15] argue that the issuers demand both a preferable ownership 
structure and liquidity in the secondary market for the shares issued. Such de-
mands create an incentive for issuers to underprice IPOs, as promoting over-
subscription helps the issuer to increase the liquidity of their shares in the sec-
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ondary market because if the firm’s shares are held by a broad group of investors 
they will have higher liquidity. 
2.1.4. Lawsuit Avoidance Theory 
In the United States of America (USA), the Securities Act of 1933 requires that 
all signatories to a prospectus are liable for any material omissions within it. As a 
result, Tinic, et al. [16] develops the hypothesis that underpricing is a form of 
insurance against the potential legal liability and associated damages to the rep-
utation of both investment bankers and the issuers. In other words, underpricing 
implicitly reduces the maximum dollar amount liability of possible lawsuits, 
since the damages are limited to the offer price.  
However, the lawsuit avoidance theory is criticised by other authors. Drake, et 
al. [17] investigated 93 IPOs that involved lawsuits after each public offering 
took place and found that the sued firms had similar underpricing levels to those 
firms that did not subsequently get sued. This result of this and other studies 
suggest that lawsuits have little influence on the degree of IPO underpricing 
[18]. 
2.1.5. Tax Motive Theory 
Dandapani, et al. [19] suggest that there is a relationship between the amount of 
personal tax paid by entrepreneurs on an IPO and its level of underpricing. The 
presence of taxes reinforces underpricing in IPOs. There are two main assump-
tions within this theoretical model. Firstly, an entrepreneur is a person who is 
responsible for setting the issue price of the shares and may retain some portion 
of ownership. Second, the purpose behind the IPO is to fund a project with a 
positive net present value (NPV). Normally, the value of a firm will increase 
when a new project with a positive NPV is undertaken. As a result, the entre-
preneur might choose to withdraw this increase in corporate value in a form of a 
royalty or dividend. However, if the shares of an IPO are underpriced and the 
entrepreneur retains some portion of the shares, the entrepreneur can keep the 
gain in a form of unrealised capital gain. Since an unrealised gain is not imme-
diately taxable, the entrepreneur may prefer to convert it to a realised taxable 
gain either in the form of a dividend or royalty, depending on the favourable tax 
rates payable by the entrepreneur. A variation of this theory was provided by 
Rydqvist [20], who suggests that underpricing is likely to be influenced by the 
prevailing tax treatment of ordinary income versus capital gains. 
2.1.6. Psychological Bias Theory 
In general, IPOs are most likely to be underpriced in order to provide investors 
with initial returns in excess of market norms. However, the long-term perfor-
mance of IPOs is often inferior to the corresponding market-index benchmark 
of performance [21]. As a result, certain authors argue that underwriters actually 
set the offer price equal to the true value of the firm, but the initial excess return 
is influenced by an overreaction by irrational investors. 
For example, Daniel, et al. [22] utilise a psychological bias perspective to sug-
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gest that certain investors are overconfident about the correctness of their pri-
vate information about an IPO. As a result, they trust their own private informa-
tion rather than publicly available information or signals from the company it-
self. This behaviour leads to overestimation in the performance of IPOs and 
overreaction on the first trading day. Furthermore, investors tend to persistently 
ignore the subsequent public information about the IPO, making the overreac-
tion in the share price persist longer. Similarly, Bloomfield, et al. [23] found that 
investors tend to overreact to unreliable information and underreact to reliable 
information. However, in the long-term, stock prices tend to reflect the correct 
value of the firm and the majority of IPOs provide poor long-term performance 
[21]. 
2.1.7. Fads Theory 
Shiller, et al. [24] developed the “Fads” theory to suggest that investment is 
another activity where investors spend time discussing, reading, and gossiping 
about successful or failed investments. As a result, it is likely that investor beha-
viour may be influenced by social dynamics. This view is supported by a number 
of authors, and suggests that social movements, fashions, or fads are an impor-
tant cause of speculation in asset price movements. 
Aggarwal, et al. [25] tested the existence of “fads” within the market for IPOs 
by developed a model that provided two possible explanations for underpricing 
in IPOs. The first explanation was that investment banks systematically under-
price IPOs to be lower than their intrinsic value. The second explanation was 
that the stock prices of IPOs in early aftermarket trading are subject to overvalu-
ation or fads. The results provided by Aggarwal, et al. [25] suggest that investors 
made gains from early price appreciation and losses in subsequent price de-
clines. These results challenge the efficient market hypothesis [26] and demon-
strate that stock markets might be inefficient, otherwise, the returns in early af-
termarket should be close to index returns. Despite this supporting evidence, the 
theory of fads with the pricing of IPOs is questioned by many researchers such 
as Kleidon [27], Marsh and Merton [28], and Lee, et al. [29]. 
2.2. Empirical Evidence of Short-Term Performance  
(Underpricing) of IPOs 
The performance of IPOs has been widely investigated by many researchers 
since the 1970s. Underpricing of IPOs has been highlighted by researchers and 
the evidence gathered to support its existence is compelling. McDonald, et al. 
[30] examined the behaviour of 142 IPOs in the US market (Dow Jones) during 
the period 1969-70 and found that on average the return on an IPO in the first 
week after trading was 28.5%. Ibbotson [9] found an initial average return of 
11.4% on IPOs offered during the 1960s, and Ibbotson, et al. [2] reported a 
16.8% excess return on IPOs during their first month of trading when compared 
to the performance benchmark provided by Standard and Poor 500 Index. Fi-
nally, Ritter [31] in an analysis of more than 5000 IPOs during the period 
G. Giannopoulos et al. 
 
 
DOI: 10.4236/tel.2018.811168 2646 Theoretical Economics Letters  
 
1960-1982, found a positive yield that averaged 18.8%.  
Evidence of IPO underpricing has also been discovered in other established 
economies throughout the world. Jog, et al. [32] and Kooli, et al. [33] found un-
derpricing of IPOs in the Canadian market. Ljungqvist [34] discovered under-
pricing of IPOs in Germany. While in Asia, Dawson [35] found IPO underpric-
ing in three Asian stock markets; Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia. Mok, et 
al. [36], Su, et al. [37] [38], and Chan, et al. [39] found evidence of IPO under-
pricing in China, and Perera, et al. [40] discovered evidence of short-term un-
derpricing in Australian IPOs. In the UK, Boulton, et al. [41] recorded an aver-
age level of 17.7% underpricing in UK IPOs completed during the period from 
2000 to 2006. Additionally, Boulton, et al. [41] found that those countries whose 
public firms produce higher quality earning information tend to have lower le-
vels of IPO underpricing. 
Although there is considerable evidence suggesting that IPOs on average are 
underpriced and therefore result in unusual initial returns mainly due to infor-
mation asymmetry [42] [43] [44] [45], a large proportion of IPOs experience an 
eventual decline in price in the long-run. Instead of underpricing, Purnanan-
dam, et al. [21] argue that IPOs are actually overpriced, as they provide a high 
first-day return but then generate poor performance in the long-run. 
2.3. Long-Term Performance of IPOs 
Unlike the consistent outstanding first-day return, IPOs appear to provide poor 
levels of long-term performance. In the US, Ritter [46] identifies that IPOs gen-
erally underperform the market or public companies with similar characteristics, 
such as size and industry. To test the long-term performance of IPOs, Ritter [46] 
analysed 1500 IPOs during the period 1975 to 1984 by comparing their return 
with the return of benchmark companies. Ritter [46] established that the IPOs 
significantly underperformed the benchmark by almost 30% after a 36 month 
period. Similarly, Ibbotson [9] examined and computed the excess returns on 
IPOs for a 10-year period from 1960 to 1969, and found that returns were no 
different from the market return. However, Ibbotson [9] did find positive per-
formance during the first year of IPO trading, negative performance during both 
the second to fourth years, and positive performance during the fifth year of 
trading. 
Generally IPOs in many world markets underperform in the long-term when 
compared to benchmarks such as the corresponding market index return or 
performance of comparable firms. For example, Lee, etc [29] found poor 
long-term performance amongst Australian IPOs. Ljungqvist [34] found that af-
ter 3-years German IPOs underperformed Germany’s broad market index by 
12%. Jaskiewicz, et al. [47] examined IPOs in Spain during 1990-2000 and found 
that, on average, Spanish IPOs generated a 36.7% lower return than the market 
index.  
Although the long-term performance of IPOs may be affected by many fac-
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tors, one important factor appears to be the reputation of the underwriting in-
stitution. Carter, et al. [48] suggest that IPO stocks handled by reputable under-
writers tend to experience less severe underperformance relative to the market. 
Su, et al. [49] also investigated the impact of underwriter reputation on the 
long-term performance of 590 Chinese IPOs during 2001-2008. They found that 
the long-term performance had a positive relationship with underwriter reputa-
tion. Their results suggest that IPOs issued by prestigious underwriters tend to 
perform better in the long-run than IPOs issued by general underwriters. Simi-
larly, Dong, et al. [50] found that quality of the underwriter influences the 
long-term performance of IPOs. IPO firms with higher quality underwriters sig-
nificantly outperform IPO with lower quality underwriters. Finally, Ritter [46] 
suggests that the long-term performance (underperformance) of IPOs may vary 
across industries. 
2.4. IPOs in Emerging Markets  
Emerging markets are becoming more important in terms of the global IPO 
market. Davies [51] reports that even the London Stock Exchange, one of the 
most developed capital markets, is not one of the top five IPO markets in terms 
of total value of IPOs offered. Similarly, Chinese IPO markets, including main-
land China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, dominated the global IPO market during 
the first 11 months of deals during 2012.  
IPO markets in emerging economies appear to be significantly different from 
other, more established IPO markets. For example, Bekaert [52] suggests that 
there are investment barriers associated with emerging equity markets in nine-
teen different countries. These emerging countries tend to have poor credit rat-
ings, high and volatile levels of inflation, lack high-quality regulatory and ac-
counting frameworks, and have limitations in terms of total market size.  
Even though the systematic risk of emerging markets differs from that exhi-
bited by developed markets, IPO underpricing is still likely to be found [53]. An 
emerging market, however, may have specific characteristics, such as country 
risk, economic conditions, and regulations that may influence both the under-
pricing and long-term performance of IPOs. The next section of this paper 
briefly discusses the characteristics of the IPO markets in the Asian-Pacific 
emerging markets of China, South Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. 
2.4.1. IPOs in China 
China has two main stock exchanges, Shanghai and Shenzhen, which operate 
separately and independently from each other. The Shanghai Stock Exchange 
was established in 1990 and in the following year Shenzhen was founded. Since 
then, Chinese stock markets have experienced rapid development and high 
growth rates. From 1992 to 2000, the number of companies listed on Chinese 
markets increased from 53 to 1088 companies. Between 2007 and 2012, the Chi-
nese economy grew by nearly 60 percent, and in 2000, Chinese stock markets (in 
aggregate) were ranked in 10th place in terms of total worldwide market capitali-
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zation, and accounted for 1.81% of the total global market capitalisation. In 
2012, Chinese stock markets ranked in the 2nd place and accounted for 6.95% of 
the world market capitalization. 
Since China is one of the fastest growing economies in the world, researchers 
have provided a wealth of information about Chinese stock markets including 
the domestic IPO market. Research focused on the short-term performance 
(underpricing) and long-term performance of IPOs in China during the period 
1990-1993. Mok, et al. [36] found extreme underpricing of 289% in A-share 
IPOs while B-Share1 IPOs were underpriced by 26%. This high level of under-
pricing appears to be a feature of Chinese IPO markets, as Chan, et al. [39] also 
found A-Share and B-Share underpricing of 178% and 11.6%, respectively in 
their study of IPOs issued in China during the period 1993-1998.  
Su, et al. [38] suggest that the long time period between the date of the offer 
and the first trading day is linked to a degree in the underpricing in Chinese IPO 
markets. Su, et al. [37] also suggest IPO in China may be the result of signalling, 
and that IPO firms in China may recoup the cost of underpricing from subse-
quent share issues. 
2.4.2. IPOs in South Korea 
South Korea has one security exchange located in Busan. The exchange is known 
as the Korea Exchange (KRX) and has integrated various types of trading such as 
stocks, bonds, futures, and other derivatives. There are three markets operating 
under the umbrella of the KRX. The Korea Composite Stock Price Index 
(KOSPI) is the main board listing medium to large capital stocks. The second 
market is the Korea Securities Dealers Association Automated Quotation 
(KOSDAQ) which is where small and medium companies with growth potential 
are listed. The third and final market is the Korea New Exchange (KONEX), 
which is relatively new, and provides finance for small business ventures looking 
to raise capital. Each market has its own specifications and requirements. For in-
stance, the KOSPI and KOSDAQ are different in terms of the size of each com-
pany’s capital requirements but also in terms of their qualitative requirements, 
such as the listing requirements and fees. 
Empirical evidence has shown that when firms go public, a significant degree 
of underpricing can be found in IPOs within many markets. The Korean IPO 
market is no exception, as during the period 2000-2007 the average initial return 
of IPOs was 57.6% which was considerably higher than the 25.7% achieved by 
IPOs in the US market during the same period. Many researchers have at-
tempted to explain the issue of underpricing within Korean markets since the 
 
 
1“The two types of tradeable stocks on the two exchanges in China are personal ‘A’ shares and ‘B’ 
shares. The personal ‘A’ shares, issued by IPO and traded in domestic currency, are exclusively for 
domestic Chinese investors. The B shares, introduced in Shanghai in February 1992 and allocated 
primarily by private placements, are traded in US currency and are exclusively for foreign investors. 
These ‘B’ shares, designed to attract much-needed foreign capital and to transform the management 
of the enterprises, are held mainly by foreign institutional investors. The A-and B-share markets are 
segmented given their ownership and institutional differences” [36]. 
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early 1990s. Kim, et al. [54] explored the motives for going public and under-
pricing and identified that the motive behind the IPO issue was related to level 
of underpricing. These results suggest that when firms issue IPOs as their last 
resort of financing, the degree of underpricing is significantly higher than when 
firms use IPOs to diversify ownership. Furthermore, Kim, et al. [55] suggest that 
financial variables such as earning per share (EPS), offer size, type of industry, 
and offer type may also have a significant effect on IPO prices in South Korea. 
2.4.3. IPOs in Malaysia 
The exchange in Malaysia is known as the Bursa Malaysia, which provides a ful-
ly-integrated exchange which consists of several wholly-owned subsidiaries. 
Each subsidiary provides and operates exchange-related services for different 
type of financial securities (e.g. equities, bonds, derivatives). In Malaysia, there 
are two separate markets, the Main market and the ACE market. Generally, the 
Main market provides a platform for well-established companies to raise funds 
while the ACE market provides alternative source of funds for companies with 
growth potential. In 2012, Bursa Malaysia was ranked 21st in terms of global 
market capitalisation with a total of 921 listed companies.   
The Malaysian IPO market has a unique way of defining an IPO issue. IPOs in 
Malaysia may refer to public offers by private sector companies or can be priva-
tisation initial public offers (PIPOs) issued by state-owned companies [56]. Ma-
laysia has promoted privatisation since 1984.Researchers have found differences 
in the degree of underpricing between private sector IPOs and PIPOs in most 
markets. For instance, Menyah, et al. [57] found that PIPOs in the UK market 
were on average underpriced by 38.7%, while IPOs were underpriced by only 
3.48%. Menyah, et al. [58] examined the Malaysian market during the period 
1984-1995 and discovered similar patterns but with a higher magnitude of un-
derpricing. IPOs in the Malaysian market had an average initial excess return of 
52.5%, whereas the average achieved by PIPOs was 103.5%.  
These results suggest that IPOs in emerging markets appear to have compara-
tively greater levels of underpricing than those offered in developed markets. 
However, the long-term performance of Malaysian IPOs appears to contradict 
the general findings from US studies of IPOs, which suggest a poor long-term 
performance in IPOs. For example, Jelic, et al. [59] examined IPOs in Malaysia 
during the period 1980-1995 and found positive levels of long-term performance 
in these IPOs for up to 3 years. 
2.4.4. IPOs in Thailand 
The Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) is a juristic entity established in 1974 and 
serves as a platform for the trading of listed securities. In 2012, SET had over 600 
companies listed with an aggregate market capitalization of $383 Billion, making 
it the 24th ranked global financial market. Thailand also has a Market for Alter-
native Investment (MAI) where small and medium size companies seeking funds 
are listed. In terms of prior work on the IPO market in Thailand, Chorruk, et al. 
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[60] identified differences in the degree of underpricing in Thailand in the pe-
riods before and after the 1997 financial crisis. During the pre-crisis period 
1988-1989, underpricing was 56.73% [61] and during 1985-1992 it was measured 
at 63.49% [62].  
Chorruk, et al. [60] examined the short-term performance of IPOs in Thail-
and in the period after the Asian financial crisis, and identified that the degree of 
underpricing in Thailand was significantly lower. Their results found that IPOs 
in Thailand are on average underpriced by only 17.6% which is lower than most 
developed markets. In contrast, the long-term performance of IPOs in Thailand 
appears to be poor. Chorruk, et al. [60] studied the cumulative monthly perfor-
mances of Thai IPOs between their 1st and 36th month of trading. They found 
that after 24 months of outperforming the market, Thai IPOs underperformed 
the market. Vithessonthi [63] provides additional evidence about this by sug-
gesting that in the long-term Thai IPOs underperformed comparable firms by 
41.68%, which is a substantially greater level of underperformance than IPOs in 
the developed markets. However, Allen, et al. [62] present contrasting evidence 
showing that the long-term performance of Thai IPOs outperformed the market 
returns by 10.02%. 
While the above work provides us with a good understanding of the IPO 
market in Thailand before the 2007 financial crisis, at the same time it appears 
appropriate to develop Chorruk’s, et al. [60] work in order to investigate the 
impact of the 2007 financial crisis on the Thai IPO market. 
2.5. Summarizing the Existing Work on IPOs in Emerging  
(Asian-Pacific) Markets 
The literature review, on IPOs suggests underpricing (in the short-term) and 
poor long-term performance. Empirical evidence of IPO underpricing has been 
discovered in most countries where equity markets are available. However, there 
are differences in the extent of this underpricing, with differences between 
countries, industries, and or sectors. IPOs in emerging (Asian-Pacific) markets 
tend to provide investors with higher initial returns than IPOs issued in devel-
oped market. As a result, companies in emerging markets appear to bear a high-
er cost from issuing IPOs, and as a result, more money is expected to be left on 
the table. There many reasons that may explain this underpricing, these include 
asymmetric information theory, agency theory, signalling theory and other sim-
ilar theories. Despite this, the exact cause of underpricing is still intensely de-
bated among researchers and there is no definitive conclusion on the matter. 
In terms of long-term performance of IPOs, the literature provides evidence 
that suggests that IPOs are most likely to perform poorly in the long-run. Yet, 
some outliers have been found in emerging markets, such as Korean IPOs and 
Thai IPOs, where long-term performance can outrun benchmarks. Some re-
searchers suggest that the poor long-term performance is caused by investors 
being too optimistic about the potential growth of young firms [46] or that IPOs 
may be overpriced from the very start [21]. 
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3. Methodology 
The section explains the methodology used to evaluate the short-term and 
long-term stock price performance of IPOs in Thailand, China, South Korea and 
Malaysia during the period before and after the 2007 financial crisis. 
3.1. Data 
IPO data are extracted from Bloomberg for a period of 10 years starting from 1st 
of January 2003 to 31st December 20122. The sample was divided into two 
sub-periods which are5 years (1st January 2003-31st December 2007) before and 5 
years (1st January 2008-31st December 2012) after the global financial crisis3. The 
total number of useable observations for Thailand, China, South Korea and Ma-
laysia are 220, 1299, 643, and 332, respectively. In addition, the Bloomberg da-
tabase is used to provide the daily and monthly historical closing prices of IPO 
firms and the relevant market index for each country. 
3.2. Research Method 
McWilliams, et al. [64] and MacKinlay [65] indicate that an event study is the 
appropriate mean to assess the impact of an unexpected event. Furthermore, 
McWilliams, et al. [64] suggest that this research approach can also be used to 
determine whether there is an abnormal stock price effect connected with this 
unanticipated event. In addition to these strengths of an event study methodol-
ogy, it also avoids the need to utilise accounting-based measures of profit, which 
may be manipulated by insiders.  
As a result, an event study methodology appears to be a suitable choice of 
method for investigating the impact of the 2007 global financial crisis on the 
short-term and long-term performance of IPOs. However, there are crucial as-
sumptions associated with the event study approach. These include the following 
assumptions: 1) markets are efficient, 2) the event is not anticipated, and 3) there 
were no confounding effects during the event window.  
The primary task for conducting an event study is to define the period in 
which the impact of the event is going to be measured. In this study, the event 
windows used to measure the short-term and long-term performance of IPOs 
are 1 day and 36 months, respectively. 
3.3. The Measurement of Short-Term Performance and  
Underpricing 
According to Rosa, et al. [66] and Chi, et al. [67], the short-term performance of 
 
 
2The sample period 2003-2012 is chosen due to data constraints i.e. the investigation of the 
long-term IPO performance requires stock market data up to 36 months after the IPO announce-
ment. 
3We divided the sample period into two sub-periods because we aim to capture the impact of finan-
cial crisis on the IPO performance therefore we document the IPO performance before and after the 
2007 financial crisis and aim to identify whether this performance is significant different between 
the two sub-periods. 
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IPOs can be measured using the percentage increase of the closing price on the 
first trading day over the original issue price: 
1
,
issue
1c ii
P
R
P
 
= − 
 
,                     (1) 
where ,c iP  is the closing price on the first trading day of an IPOi and issueP  is 
the issue price of IPOi. The corresponding benchmark of each country is its 
stock market index. The return on the market index in a corresponding period 
is: 
1
1
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1mm
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,                     (2) 
where 
1m
R  is the first day’s comparable market return, 
1m
R  is the closing  
market index value on the first trading day and 
issuem
P  is the closing market  
index value on the offering day of the corresponding stock. 
The market-adjusted abnormal return for IPOi can be calculated by using the 
two returns calculated in Equation (1) and Equation (2) as follows: 
1 1 1i i m
MAAR R R= − .                      (3) 
The sample mean of market-adjusted abnormal return for the first day of 
trading can be calculated as: 
1
1 1
1 n
iiMAAR MAARn =
= ∑ .                   (4) 
To test whether the mean of market-adjusted return is significantly different 
from zero, standardised t-statistic is computed as: 
1
MAAR
MAARt
S n
= ,                      (5) 
where S is the sample standard deviation of abnormal returns ( )1iMAAR  and 𝑛𝑛 
is the number of sample IPOs. Additionally, another measurement tool applied 
is the wealth relative, WR1, which can be calculated as: 
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According to Ritter [46], a wealth relative of greater than 1.00 indicates that 
IPOs outperform the market in the corresponding period. A wealth relative of 
less than 1.00 indicates that IPOs underperform the market. 
3.4. The Measurement of Long-Term Performance—The  
Aftermarket Performance 
Cumulative abnormal return (CARs) 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) were first used by Ritter [46] to meas-
ure the long-term performance of IPOs. In order to calculate CARs, first the raw 
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return of the IPOi for the event month t is computed as: 
,
,
, 1
1i ti t
i t
P
R
P −
 
= −  
 
,                      (7) 
where ,i tR  is the monthly raw return of the IPOi in the event month t, ,i tP  is 
the closing price at the end of month t of the IPOi, , 1i tP −  is the closing price of 
the IPOi at the end of month 1t − 4. Second, the same mathematical rational is 
applied to calculate the benchmark return for the IPOi as follows: 
,
,
. 1
1m tm t
m t
P
R
P −
 
= − 
 
,                      (8) 
where ,m tR  is the monthly benchmark return of the IPOi in the event month t, 
,m tP  is the closing price of the benchmark at the end of month t of the IPOi, 
. 1m tP −  is the closing price of the benchmark at the end of month 1t − . 
Third, the benchmark (market) adjusted abnormal returns ,i tAR  are com-
puted by taking the difference of the raw return ,i tR  of the IPOi and the 
benchmark return ,m tR  over the corresponding period (event month t). 
, , ,i t i t m tAR R R= − .                       (9) 
Fourth, the average abnormal benchmark-adjusted return of the portfolio 
with 𝑛𝑛IPOs for the event month t is calculated as follows: 
,1
1 n
t i tiA ARn
R
=
= ∑                       (10) 
Fifth, in order to measure the cumulative average benchmark-adjusted returns 
for the long-term performance from event month 1 to month t, the following 
calculation is applied: 
1, 1 t
t
t t ARCAR == ∑ .                     (11) 
Finally, the standardised t-statistic is computed to assess whether the cumula-
tive average benchmark-adjusted returns is significantly different from zero.  
1,t
CAR
CAR
t
S n
= .                      (12) 
The above measurements of long-term performance of IPOs are widely ac-
cepted in the literature [46] [68]. 
3.5. Performance Benchmarks 
As discussed earlier, three of the Asian-Pacific emerging markets, under consid-
eration, have more than one stock exchange (e.g. Thailand, China, and South 
Korea). As the IPOs in these countries may be issued on different stock markets, 
the corresponding benchmark(s) of each IPOs is (are) explained as follows.  
For Thailand, two benchmarks are applied in the above calculations. The 
 
 
4We investigate the long term performance post the listing month, so the 12, 24 and 36 months long 
term IPO returns do not include the listing month return. i.e., we exclude the impact of short term 
underpricing in the measurement of the long term IPO performance. 
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Stock Exchange of Thailand Index is the benchmark for IPOs issued in SET 
market. The Market for Alternative Investment Index is the benchmark for its 
corresponding IPOs. For China, the benchmarks utilised are the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange Composite Index and Shenzhen Stock Exchange Composite Index. 
For South Korea, the Korea Composite Stock Price Index and Korean Securities 
Dealers Automated Quotations Index are selected as the benchmarks. For Ma-
laysia, the Kuala Lumpur Composite Index is the benchmark against IPOs issued 
in the Bursa Malaysia stock market. 
The underpricing of each IPO is tested against the market index return of the 
same period to eliminate the confounding effect. The t-test is then used to con-
firm whether the underpricing is significantly different from zero. In the 
long-term, the performance of IPOs is accessed by using the cumulative average 
returns which have been adjusted by the market index returns. 
4. Results 
This section presents the results of the research study for the IPOs in Thailand, 
China, South Korea, and Malaysia. 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Each set of descriptive statistics are presented in a tabular, panel data format, 
with Thailand, China, South Korea, and Malaysia being allocated to panels A, B, 
C and D, respectively.  For the purposes of this event study, each country’s  
sample of IPOs were allocated into either a pre-crisis or a post-crisis time-period 
covering the years 2003-2007 and 2008-2012, respectively. 
4.1.1. Analysis of IPOs in Thailand 
Panel A of Table 1 illustrates that a greater number of IPOs were issued in 
Thailand before the financial crisis. The 153 IPOs issued during 2003-2007 were 
primarily made up of IPOs from the industrial, consumer cyclical, financial, and 
basic material sectors. However, during the post-crisis period the number of 
IPOs declined substantially, with the consumer cyclical and industrial sectors 
leading the way. In the post-crisis period, Thailand’s 5-year average GDP growth 
rate decreased from 5.6% to 2.9% after 2007. In addition, market risk and un-
certainty were further increased as a result of political unrest that occurred in the 
country during 2007. Under this context, the reduction in the total number of 
Thai IPOs is relatively easy to explain. Similarly, Chorruk, et al. [60] found evi-
dence of fewer IPOs being issued after the 1997 financial crisis. In the period of 
uncertainty after the financial crisis, Thai firms were less confident in their abil-
ity to undertake a successful IPO. Going public incurs a large amount of direct 
(e.g. underwriter fees) and indirect costs (e.g. underpricing cost). If market and 
economic risk increases, rational investors will require higher compensation, 
making it even more costly for firms who decide to go public. 
Panel A of Table 2 illustrates that before the financial crisis the 70% of IPOs 
were issued by the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), which is where companies  
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Table 1. Numbers of IPOs by industry. (A) Panel A Thailand; (B) Panel B China; (C) 
Panel C South Korea; (D) Panel D Malaysia. 
(A) 
Industry Sector 
Numbers of IPOs 
'03 - 07 '08 - 12 Total 
Basic Materials 22 14% 9 13% 31 14% 
Communications 11 7% 7 10% 18 8% 
Consumer, Cyclical 27 18% 18 27% 45 20% 
Consumer, Non-cyclical 13 8% 9 13% 22 10% 
Energy 5 3% 1 1% 6 3% 
Financial 22 14% 5 7% 27 12% 
Industrial 45 29% 14 21% 59 27% 
Technology 7 5% 1 1% 8 4% 
Utilities 1 1% 3 4% 4 2% 
Total 153 
 67  220  
(B) 
Industry Sector 
Numbers of IPOs 
'03 - 07 '08 - 12 Total 
Basic Materials 53 15% 99 10% 152 12% 
Communications 12 3% 49 5% 61 5% 
Consumer, Cyclical 57 16% 125 13% 182 14% 
Consumer, Non-cyclical 55 16% 142 15% 197 15% 
Energy 10 3% 22 2% 32 2% 
Financial 18 5% 17 2% 35 3% 
Industrial 107 30% 403 43% 510 39% 
Technology 30 9% 81 9% 111 9% 
Utilities 9 3% 10 1% 19 1% 
Total 351 
 948  1,299  
(C) 
Industry Sector 
Numbers of IPOs 
'03 - 07 '08 - 12 Total 
Basic Materials 17 5% 19 6% 36 6% 
Communications 45 14% 35 11% 80 12% 
Consumer, Cyclical 41 12% 35 11% 76 12% 
Consumer, Non-cyclical 37 11% 33 11% 70 11% 
Energy 1 0% 4 1% 5 1% 
Financial 42 13% 25 8% 67 10% 
Industrial 95 29% 97 31% 192 30% 
Technology 52 16% 59 19% 111 17% 
Utilities 1 0% 5 2% 6 1% 
Total 331 
 312  643  
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(D) 
Industry Sector 
Numbers of IPOs 
'03 - 07 '08 - 12 Total 
Basic Materials 20 9% 9 9% 29 9% 
Communications 19 8% 7 7% 26 8% 
Consumer, Cyclical 18 8% 15 15% 33 10% 
Consumer, Non-cyclical 40 17% 17 17% 57 17% 
Energy 7 3% 9 9% 16 5% 
Financial 16 7% 7 7% 23 7% 
Industrial 75 32% 27 27% 102 31% 
Technology 37 16% 9 9% 46 14% 
Utilities 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
Total 232 
 100  332  
 
Table 2. Numbers of IPOs by exchange market. (A) Panel A Thailand; (B) Panel B China; 
(C) Panel C South Korea. (D) Panel D Malaysia. 
(A) 
Exchange Market 
Numbers of IPOs 
'03 - 07 '08 - 12 Total 
Stock Exchange of Thailand 107 70% 29 43% 136 62% 
Market for Alternative Investment 46 30% 38 57% 84 38% 
Total 153  67  220  
(A) 
Exchange Market 
Numbers of IPOs 
'03 - 07 '08 - 12 Total 
Shanghai Stock Exchange 148 42% 97 10% 245 19% 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange 203 58% 851 90% 1,054 81% 
Total 351  948  1,299  
(C) 
Exchange Market 
Numbers of IPOs 
'03 - 07 '08 - 12 Total 
Korea Stock Exchange 81 24% 74 24% 155 24% 
KOSDAQ Exchange 250 76% 238 76% 488 76% 
Total 331  312  643  
(D) 
Exchange Market 
Numbers of IPOs 
'03 - 07 '08 - 12 Total 
Bursa Malaysia 232 100% 100 100% 332 100% 
Total 232  100  332  
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with medium to large market capital needs raise their funds. However, in the 
post-crisis period most IPOs were issued through the Market for Alternative In-
vestment (MAI). Considering the differences of both exchanges, SET provides a 
platform for medium to large capitalisation enterprises, while MAI is suitable for 
small and medium size enterprises (SME). Firms listed on the SET exchange are 
generally more mature in their development, while the SMEs listed on the MAI 
exchange are firms seeking funds for growth. 
4.1.2. Analysis of IPOs in China 
Panel B of Table 1 shows that, in general, the number of IPOs issued in China 
increased substantially in the post-crisis period. A key factor behind this sub-
stantial increase in the number of Chinese IPOs during this period was the 
country’s high rate of economic growth. For example, Chinese GDP increased by 
an annual rate of 9.6% and 10.4% in the years 2008 and 2010, respectively.  
Another factor was that in 2007 the Chinese government introduced a new 
regulation that required local companies that were listed on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange to return to an exchange in mainland. The top three industry 
sectors in China before the crisis were industrial, consumer-cyclical, and con-
sumer-non-cyclical (30%, 16%, and 16%, respectively). After the crisis, there was 
no change in the top three positions, with the industrial sector expanding its 
share of the Chinese IPO market. 
Panel B of Table 2 illustrates the number of IPOs issued on Chinese markets 
during the periods 2003-2007 and 2008-2012. While the Shanghai Stock Ex-
change experienced a decrease in the total number of IPOs being placed, the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange experienced a considerable increase in IPO activity 
during the post-crisis period. In general, large market-capitalization companies 
are listed in Shanghai, whereas small and medium-capitalization companies are 
listed in Shenzhen. 
4.1.3. Analysis of IPOs in South Korea 
Panel C of Table 1 illustrates that the Korean IPO market was dominated by 
industrial and technology companies during the period 2003-2007. After 2007, 
the industrial sector still dominated IPO activity with a 31% market share fol-
lowed by the technology sector with a 19% share of total IPOs. It appears that 
the financial crisis did not adversely affect the total number of IPOs coming to 
market in South Korea. The industrial and technology sectors in South Korea 
continued to perform well in the post-crisis period. In addition, South Korean 
companies managed to expand their exports to emerging markets, and Korea’s 
GDP was supported by a recovery in domestic demand [69]. A key element in 
South Korea’s rapid recovery from the financial crisis was the diversification 
within its export destinations.  
Panel C of Table 2 indicates that the total number of IPOs being issued in 
South Korea was relatively unaffected by the financial crisis. Both of the ex-
changes in South Korea experienced only a slight decrease in the number of 
G. Giannopoulos et al. 
 
 
DOI: 10.4236/tel.2018.811168 2658 Theoretical Economics Letters  
 
IPOs during the post-crisis period. The number of IPOs occurring on the 
KOSDAQ market is higher because this exchange is preferred by the vast major-
ity of small and medium sized companies seeking to go public. 
4.1.4. Analysis of IPOs in Malaysia 
Panel D of Table 1 illustrates that the total number of IPOs on the Malaysian 
market was adversely affected by the financial crisis, as the total number de-
clined by 57% between the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. After the financial 
crisis, the Malaysian economy experienced a significant downturn i.e. 1.5% con-
traction in GDP during 2009. As investor sentiment is one of the most important 
factors affecting a company’s decision to go public [5], it is no surprise that the 
downturn in the Malaysian economy delayed the IPOs of many private compa-
nies. Before the crisis, the main contributors of the Malaysian IPO market were 
industrial, consumer-cyclical, and technology sectors. After the crisis, the indus-
trial sector still held a 27% market share, although the total number of IPOs in 
all sectors declined, apart from Energy.   
Overall, the aforementioned tables of national IPO activity in the pre-crisis 
and post-crisis periods provide a record of how the financial crisis affected the 
total number of companies going public in each of the four Asian-Pacific coun-
tries. While the impact varied by country, the financial crisis reduced IPO activ-
ity in all countries apart from China. China was an exceptional as IPO activity 
during the period was supported by strong economic growth and a change in 
Chinese stock market regulations. Nonetheless, a common trend across the four 
countries is that IPOs were more frequently issued by companies from the in-
dustrial sectors of each economy. 
4.2. Short-Term Performance (Underpricing) 
Previous research on IPOs suggests that most public offerings are likely to be 
under-priced, and as a result, IPOs tend to generate significant positive returns 
during the first trading day [9] [31]. Next, this paper explores whether the level 
of IPO underpricing in Thailand, China, South Korea and Malaysia was affected 
by the global financial crisis. 
4.2.1. Underpricing in Thailand 
Panel A of Table 3 demonstrates that the average degree of IPO underpricing in 
Thailand during the pre-crisis 2003-2007 period was 19%, which is significant at 
1% level. This result is in line with previous research conducted by Chorruk, et 
al. [60] that examined the Thai market during 1997-2007 and found an average 
degree of underpricing of 17.6%. Surprisingly, the average underpricing substan-
tially increased to 44% after the crisis, which is also significant at 1% level. 
However, given the significant drop in IPO activity in Thai market post the 2007 
financial crisis (see Table 1, Panel A) issuing Thai firms left on the table less 
US$ than the pre-crisis period (US $0.1 and 0.34 billion in the post-crisis and 
pre-crisis five years period, respectively). Ritter [31] mentions that riskier IPOs  
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Table 3. Market-adjusted short-term returns of IPOs. (A) Panel A Thailand; (B) Panel B 
China; (C) Panel C South Korea; (D) Panel D Malaysia. 
(A) 
 2003-2007 2008-2012 2003-2012 
Mean 0.190*** 0.440*** 0.266*** 
t-statistic 6.611 6.365 8.884 
Wealth Relative 1.190 1.439 1.266 
Observations 53 67 220 
t-statistic of the difference of the two sample mean market adjusted returns is −3.956***. 
(B) 
 2003-2007 2008-2012 2003-2012 
Mean 1.141*** 0.415*** 0.611*** 
t-statistic 22.059 25.350 29.913 
Wealth Relative 2.140 1.416 1.612 
Observations 351 948 1299 
t-statistic of the difference of the two sample mean market adjusted returns is 17.521***. 
(C) 
 2003-2007 2008-2012 2003-2012 
Mean 0.437*** 0.279*** 0.360*** 
t-statistic 17.054 11.466 20.062 
Wealth Relative 1.437 1.278 1.360 
Observations 331 312 643 
t-statistic of the difference of the two sample mean market adjusted returns is 4.477***. 
(D) 
 2003-2007 2008-2012 2003-2012 
Mean 0.301*** 0.113*** 0.244*** 
t-statistic 9.321 2.211 8.834 
Wealth Relative 1.301 1.113 1.245 
Observations 232 100 332 
t-statistic of the difference of the two sample mean market adjusted returns is 4.323***. Notes: the 
short-term performance of IPOs is measured using the percentage change of the closing price on the first 
trading day over the original issue price adjusted by the market return over the same period. *, **, *** de-
notes statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
are likely to be more underpriced than less risky IPOs. According to asymmetric 
information theory, the uncertainty about the IPOs price is positively related to 
the degree of underpricing [3]. Not only the risk of economic downturn but also 
the political risk in Thailand had added more uncertainty to the Thai stock 
market. Thai political crisis has evolved since 2006 and got worsen in 2008 when 
the protestors decided to siege the international airport of Thailand. The 
changes of risk composition after the crisis push the IPO firms to provide more 
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incentive for investors to invest in their firms in the time of high uncertainty.  
Furthermore, the average level of IPO underpricing before and after the crisis 
in Thailand are significantly different from one another, at 1% level of signific-
ance. These results confirm that after the financial crisis in 2007, the underpric-
ing of Thai IPOs significantly increased5. In general, Thai IPOs are more likely to 
be underpriced with a higher magnitude of underpricing after the crisis due to 
both external (the world economy slow down) and internal risk factors (the po-
litical unrest). 
4.2.2. Underpricing in China 
In contrast to the situation in Thailand, the magnitude of Chinese IPO under-
pricing declined dramatically after the financial crisis. This change in under-
pricing of Chinese IPOs is represented by the decline in the mean value of mar-
ket-adjusted returns (MAAR) in Panel B of Table 3. Underpricing in China de-
creased significantly from 114.1% in the pre-crisis period to only 41.5% after the 
crisis. The t-statistics suggests that both mean values are significantly positive at 
the 1% level. Also, the t-statistic of the difference of the two sample means con-
firms that the two means are statistically different from each other. 
The pre-crisis results of this study are in line with the results of previous stu-
dies of the Chinese IPO market. Chi, et al. [67] founda market-adjusted return 
during 1996-2000 of 129%. Even though the severity of underpricing decreased 
in the post-crisis period (41.5% from 114.1%), it is still relatively high when 
compared to the underpricing present within most developed IPO markets. 
Given the significant increase in IPO activity in the Chinese market in the 
post-crisis period (see Table 1, Panel B), issuing Chinese firms left US $70 bil-
lion on the table in the post-crisis period, an amount thatfar exceeded the total 
value left on the table during the pre-crisis period (US $23 billion). The high lev-
el of IPO underpricing in China may be partly explained by the characteristics of 
Chinese stock market. Most Chinese investors are individual investors, who tend 
to lack investment knowledge and invest to earn speculative returns [70]. In ad-
dition while the demand for IPOs in China is high, the number of new shares 
available to investors is limited, due to the high proportion of shares held by go-
vernmental bodies. As a result, as Chinese investors attempt to buy shares of 
new IPO firms on the first trading day, the overall level of underpricing is in-
creased. 
In an effort to alleviate such structural market problems, during 2005 the 
Chinese government announced stock market reforms aimed to reduce the pro-
portion of shares held by governmental bodies. This reform increased the avail-
ability of shares in certain Chinese IPOs, thereby reducing the overall level of 
underpricing in the Chinese stock markets. 
 
 
5However, the average market-adjusted return of 44% during 2008-2012 are in contrast to Chorruk, 
et al. [60] who suggests that IPOs in Thailand tend to be less under-priced than those of developed 
countries i.e. [53] documented average degrees of underpricing in the US, the UK, and Germany of 
16.8%, 16.1% and 24.2%, respectively. 
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4.2.3. Underpricing in South Korea 
Panel C of Table 3 suggests that similarly to the Chinese Market, underpricing 
of South Korean IPOs declined in the post-crisis period. The average mar-
ket-adjusted return decreased from 43.7% to 27.9%, at 1% level of significance. 
In addition, the t-test of the difference of the two-mean values was 4.48 indicat-
ing that the level of underpricing in the post-crisis period was significantly lower 
than in the pre-crisis period. In summary, IPOs in South Korea were generally 
underpriced in both time periods, although the amount left on the table in-
creased from US $40 and 64 billion during the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, 
respectively. 
4.2.4. Underpricing in Malaysia 
Panel D of Table 3 illustrates the level of IPO underpricing in Malaysia. During 
2003-2007, Malaysian IPOs were underpriced by an average of 30.1%, at 1% level 
of significance. While these results are not in line with the earlier findings of 
Paudyal, et al. [58] who found average underpricing of 61.8% during 1984-1995, 
they support the theoretical predictions that the privatisation of enterprises 
owned by the Malaysian state may contribute to the high level of IPO under-
pricing in the Malaysian market. 
In the post-crisis period, Malaysian IPOs experienced similar trend in under-
pricing as those reported in China and South Korea. The average initial excess 
return of Malaysian IPOs decreased from 30.1% to 11.3%, suggesting that un-
derpricing was significantly lower(at the 1% level) in the post-crisis period6. 
Overall, as a consequence of IPO underpricing in the Malaysian market during 
2003-2012, issuing Malaysian firms left US $2.3 billion on the table. The overall 
results of our underpricing analysis in each of the four Asian-Pacific emerging 
markets supports the theoretical expectation of significant IPO underpricing in 
emerging markets during both the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. Further-
more, it is commonly found that the level of IPO underpricing in the pre-crisis 
period differed from the post-crisis period which suggests that the financial cri-
sis affected the pricing behaviour of IPOs in each country. However, it is impor-
tant to note that the Thai IPO market showed an opposite trend to the other 
three countries. Thailand exhibited higher levels of underpricing because of se-
vere political instability, while the other three countries faced lower underpric-
ing due to reforms which reduced uncertainty. For example, IPO underpricing 
in China was influenced by regulatory reforms. However, the level of under-
pricing in each of the four emerging markets studied is relatively high when 
compared to the results of studies on IPOs in developed countries. The econom-
ic significance of the high level of IPO underpricing in the emerging markets of 
the Asian-Pacific region (given the high IPO activity) is evidenced by the fact 
that during 2003-2012 (before and after the financial crisis), issuing firms in the 
 
 
6Demand for IPOs had dropped in Malaysia due to Global financial crisis (see Panel D of Table 1), 
which can be detected from the lower over-subscription ratio. The over-subscription ratio is partly 
related to the degree of underpricing. Lower over-subscription ratio usually results in lower initial 
return. 
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four Asian-Pacific emerging markets left more than US$ 200 billion on the table. 
The level of underpricing in these four Asian-Pacific emerging markets became 
more evident in the post-crisis period, given the increase of IPO activity in this 
period. In particular, issuing firms in these four Asian-Pacific emerging markets 
left on the table US $64 and 136 billion in the pre-crisis and post-crisis five years 
period, respectively, which may affect negative the potentials for economic 
growth in the region. Although the results of short-term performance analysis 
provide valuable evidence about the extent of IPO underpricing in each country, 
it does not fully explain the overall performance of IPOs. As a result, next section 
analyses the long-term performance of IPOs in each of the four Asian-Pacific 
emerging markets in both the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. 
4.3. Analysis of Long-Term Performance in Emerging IPO Markets 
Although the majority of prior studies provide evidence of widespread under-
pricing of IPOs, critics of such work argue that IPOs may not really be under-
priced. For example, investment banks may correctly price an IPO but the offer 
price could be influenced by “noisyinvestors” who are overconfident (optimistic) 
about the potential growth of IPO companies [21]. Indeed, prior research sug-
gests that IPO companies generally generate poor long-term returns for inves-
tors. However, this may not be the case for IPOs in emerging markets, as empir-
ical evidence suggests that emerging markets provide outstanding long-term 
performance [55] [59] due to government intervention and rapid economic 
growth. 
In order to extend our existing knowledge of long-term performance of IPOs 
in emerging markets, this section analyses the long-term performance of IPOs in 
the Asian-Pacific emerging markets of Thailand, China, South Korea, and Ma-
laysia during the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. 
4.3.1. Long-Term Performance of IPOs in Thailand 
Panel A of Table 4 summarises the long-term performance of Thai IPOs. CARs 
are calculated on a monthly basis from month 1 to 36. The results indicate that 
the long-term performance of Thai IPOs appear to outperform the market in-
dex. During 2003-2007, the 36 month CAR is 7.5%, at a 1% level of significance. 
The 36 month CAR achieved in the post-crisis period was 43.1%, significantly 
higher than that achieved in the pre-crisis period, at a 1% level of significance 
(t-statistic is 3.03). 
Figure 1 illustrates the CAR results for Thai IPOs. Before the crisis, the CAR 
reached zero in month 16 and was negative up to month 27. This poor 
long-term performance is similar to that found by Chorruk, et al. [60], who 
identified that the CAR of Thai IPOs declined to zero during month 24. Results 
of the post-crisis period are in contrast with the traditional pattern, as CAR re-
mained positive from month 1 to 36. The bullish trend in Thai stock market in 
the post-crisisperiod may be one of the factors that influence the long-term per-
formance of IPOs to beat the benchmark. 
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Table 4. Cumulative average benchmark-adjusted returns (CAR) for the pre-crisis period 
(2003-2007) and post-crisis period (2008-2013). (A) Panel A Thailand; (B) Panel B China; 
(C) Panel C South Korea; (D) Panel D Malaysia.  
(A) 
Month 
2003-2007 2008-2012 
CAR StdDev t-stat Size CAR StdDev t-stat Size 
12 0.031*** 0.128 2.985 152 0.194*** 0.142 9.578 49 
24 −0.046*** 0.130 −4.313 150 0.317*** 0.101 19.586 39 
36 0.075*** 0.186 4.880 147 0.431*** 0.091 24.970 28 
t-statistic of the difference of the two sample CARs over the 36 month period is 3.03***. 
(B) 
Month 
2003-2007 2008-2012 
CAR StdDev t-stat Size CAR StdDev t-stat Size 
12 −0.106*** 0.125 −15.883 351 −0.014*** 0.102 −3.817 798 
24 −0.052*** 0.118 −8.312 351 −0.001 0.081 −0.261 519 
36 0.050*** 0.141 6.597 351 0.250*** 0.250 34.942 171 
t-statistic of the difference of the two sample CARs over the 36 month period is 3.31***. 
(C) 
Month 
2003-2007 2008-2012 
CAR StdDev t-stat Size CAR StdDev t-stat Size 
12 −0.009 0.156 −1.094 331 0.097*** 0.173 9.379 282 
24 0.091*** 0.179 9.215 331 0.199*** 0.147 18.295 204 
36 0.189*** 0.136 25.165 331 0.505*** 0.126 41.512 109 
t-statistic of the difference of the two sample CARs over the 36 month period is 1.77*. 
(D) 
Month 
2003-2007 2008-2012 
CAR StdDev t-stat Size CAR StdDev t-stat Size 
12 −0.036*** 0.128 −4.291 231 −0.115*** 0.111 −9.670 87 
24 −0.185*** 0.147 −19.215 231 −0.203*** 0.088 −18.064 61 
36 −0.258*** 0.162 −24.248 231 −0.309*** 0.140 −13.057 35 
t-statistic of the difference of the two sample CARs over the 36 month period is 0.74. Notes: Cumulative 
average benchmark-adjusted abnormal return (CAR) over 12, 24 and 36 month period is the sum of the 
monthly average market-adjusted abnormal returns during the relevant period. *, **, *** denotes statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
4.3.2. Long-Term Performance of IPOs in China 
CARs over the 36 months period shown in Panel B of Table 4 illustrate that 
Chinese IPOs outperformed the market during both 2003-2007 and 2008-2012 
periods, 5% and 25%, respectively. In addition, it is evident that IPO CARs for 
the 36 months post-crisis period are significantly higher than those of the 
pre-crisis period, at 1% level (t-statistic is 3.31). 
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Figure 1. Thai IPOs—Cumulative average benchmark-adjusted returns for pre-crisis 
(2003-2007) and post-crisis (2008-2013) periods.  
 
Chen, et al. [71] investigated IPO CARs in China over the period 1996 to 2005 
and found that CARs over 24 and 36 months period are 2.4% and −0.1%, respec-
tively. They suggest that the long-term IPO CAR is not likely to outperform the 
market. Similarly, Figure 2, which provides a detailed picture of the Chinese 
IPOs performance in the pre and post-crisis period, illustrates that the CARs of 
Chinese IPOs during most of the pre-crisis period underperformed the market. 
On the contrary the CARs of the post-crisis period appear to over perform the 
market especially after the 24 months post-IPO period. 
4.3.3. Long-Term Performance of IPOs in South Korea 
Panel C of Table 4 documents the long-term performance of South Korean 
IPOs. The long-term performance results for South Korean IPOs are interesting 
as they differ from the results obtained from the other emerging markets under 
investigation. In particular CARs over the 36 months period during the 
pre-crisis and post-crisis periods are both significantly positive, 18.9% and 
50.5%, respectively, at 1% level of significance. These findings are in line with 
the earlier work of Kim, et al. [55], who found that Korean IPOs were likely to 
generate outstanding long-term performance. 
Figure 3 illustrates that Korean IPOs are likely to outperform the market in 
the long-term. However, the t-test for the difference of the two sample mean 
values (see Panel C of Table 4) suggests that there is a significantly statistical 
difference (only at 10% level) between the CARs before and after the financial 
crisis. A possible explanation for the increased (post-crisis) long-term perfor-
mance of Korean IPOs is that their returns were influenced by the improved 
performance of the Korean Stock Market, whose index increased from 1100 to 
2000 points during the period 2009-2012. 
4.3.4. Long-Term Performance of IPOs in Malaysia 
Malaysia is the only country where long-term IPO performance resulted in high  
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Figure 2. Chinese IPOs—Cumulative average benchmark-adjusted returns by month for 
pre-crisis (2003-2007) and post-crisis (2008-2013) periods.  
 
 
Figure 3. South Korean IPOS—Cumulative average benchmark-adjusted returns for 
pre-crisis (2003-2007) and post-crisis (2008-2013) periods.   
 
negative returns. Panel D of Table 4 illustrates that IPO CARs over the 36 
month period were −25.8% and −30.9% in the pre-crisis and post crisis periods, 
respectively. Previous research on the Malaysian IPO market suggests that Ma-
laysian IPOs did not out-perform or under-perform the market [58]. On the 
other hand, Jelic, et al. [59] suggest that Malaysian IPOs tend to outperform the 
market in the long-term. The results of the present study appear to differ due to 
the calendar period being analysed and the methodology used. For example,  
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Figure 4. Malaysia—Cumulative average benchmark-adjusted returns for pre-crisis 
(2003-2007) and post-crisis (2008-2013) periods. 
 
Paudyal, et al. [58] applied daily market-adjusted compounded returns. 
Figure 4 provides clear evidence that Malaysian IPOs underperformed the 
market in both periods. 
5. Conclusions 
This study investigated the effects of the 2007 global financial crisis on the rela-
tive short-term and long-term performance of IPOs in the Asian-Pacific emerg-
ing markets of Thailand, China, South Korea, and Malaysia. The results of this 
study suggest that the short and long-term performance of IPOs in each of the 
four emerging markets were significantly affected by the 2007 financial crisis. 
However, the extent of this impact was inconsistent across the four markets.   
While IPO underpricing increased in Thailand partly as a result of increased 
political uncertainty, the level of underpricing actually decreased in China, South 
Korea, and Malaysia. Between the pre-crisis and post crisis periods, IPO under-
pricing in Thailand increased from 19% to 44%. In contrast, underpricing in 
Chinese, South Korean and Malaysian IPO markets declined from 114% to 
41.5%, 43.7% to 27.9%, and 30.1% to 11.3%, respectively. Even though under-
pricing in emerging markets has been reduced due to regulatory reforms [72] 
[73], it is still high compared to developed markets. This may be due to govern-
ment ownership [74], owner dispersion [75], and ex-ante uncertainty [38] [71].  
In terms of the long-term performance of IPOs in the post-crisis period, IPOs 
in Thailand, China, and South Korea all outperformed the benchmark in the 36 
month period after each IPOs was placed. In contrast, the long-term perfor-
mance of Malaysian IPOs was poor. During the post-crisis period of 2008-2012, 
IPOs in South Korea generated the highest performance with a CAR of 50.5% 
during the 36 months period after IPO placement. The post-crisis long-term 
CAR performance results for Thailand, China and Malaysia were 43.1%, 25% 
and −30.9%, respectively.  
The long-term performance results for each of the four emerging markets are 
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interesting, as they also contradict the results and observations from IPOs stu-
dies in developed markets. While, most IPOs in developed markets appear to 
underperform the market in the long-term, the results of this study suggest that 
IPOs in emerging markets outperformed the market in the long-run, especially 
in the post-crisis period.  
The policy implications of this study are very important for financial regula-
tors and corporations (firms) seeking for new sources of finance through capital 
markets. More specifically, the economic significance of the high level of IPO 
underpricing in the Asian-Pacific emerging markets during 2003-2012 period 
(before and after the financial crisis) is evident by the US $200 billion left on the 
table by issuing firms. Given the increase of IPO activity in the Asian-Pacific 
emerging markets in the post-crisis period, the significance of the economic im-
plications of IPO underpricing in the emerging markets (in the Asian-pacific re-
gion) becomes more evident. In particular, issuing firms in these four 
Asian-Pacific emerging markets left on the table US $64 and 136 billion in the 
pre-crisis and post-crisis five years period, respectively, which may affect nega-
tive the potentials for economic growth in the region.  
In this research study the analysis of the IPO performance is limited only to 
four (emerging) countries. In addition, the research on the IPO performance is 
conducted separately for each country to provide more specific information for 
each country’s IPO performance. Future research on the IPO performance of the 
Asian-pacific emerging markets may be conducted on a pooled basis.  
The inconsistency in the comparative short and long-term performance of 
IPOs in emerging and developed markets is a potential area for future research. 
In addition, it would be interesting to investigate the specific factors that affect 
IPO performance in emerging markets. For instance, Warther [76] found a high 
correlation between security returns and fund flows, and Richards [77] investi-
gated the impact of foreign investors in emerging markets. As a result, the 2007 
financial crisis may have diverted international capital flows towards emerging 
markets, thereby increasing overall IPO performance in these regions. 
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